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Abstract
BitTorrent is a widely-deployed, peer-to-peer file transfer
protocol engineered with a “tit for tat” mechanism that
encourages cooperation. Unfortunately, there is little in-
centive for nodes to altruistically provide service to their
peers after they finish downloading a file, and what altru-
ism there is can be exploited by aggressive clients like Bit-
Tyrant. This altruism, called seeding, is always beneficial
and sometimes essential to BitTorrent’s real-world perfor-
mance. We propose a new long-term incentives mecha-
nism in BitTorrent to encourage peers to seed and we eval-
uate its effectiveness via simulation. We show that when
nodes running our algorithm reward one another for good
behavior in previous swarms, they experience as much as
a 50% improvement in download times over unrewarded
nodes. Even when aggressive clients, such as BitTyrant,
participate in the swarm, our rewarded nodes still outper-
form them, although by smaller margins.
1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer file transfer protocols provide scalable archi-
tectures for distributing large files. The core idea is to
have peers participating in the download also contribute
upload service back to the system, thus scaling the avail-
able bandwidth as more peers join. Even centralized ser-
vices with large network connections can be overwhelmed
by flash crowds, while p2p services can ostensibly con-
tinue to scale, even in such extreme scenarios.
In the practical world, however, scalability and stability
in p2p systems are limited by the cooperation of the par-
ticipants. These systems only have as much bandwidth
as is collectively donated. Proper behavior cannot neces-
sarily be enforced; participants are going to behave ratio-
nally, taking whatever steps maximize their own benefit
without particularly caring about the well-being of other
peers. Consequently, the default behavior of most par-
ticipants is to consume and not contribute. This is often
called the “free rider” problem.
BitTorrent [3] mitigates the free rider problem by re-
warding uploads by granting faster downloads through a
“tit for tat” (TFT) protocol, thus making cooperation a
rational behavior. This design has been highly success-
ful, enabling BitTorrent’s wide acceptance in the Inter-
net community. While there is no consensus on the true
amount of BitTorrent data in-flight today, it is clear that
the number is large at somewhere between one-third and
one-half of all Internet traffic [14, 6, 20, 19].
Despite the practical success of BitTorrent, numerous
researchers have exposed weaknesses to the TFT incen-
tives mechanism [15, 22, 21, 8]. One prominent weakness
is the significant level of altruism that remains in the sys-
tem despite the TFT mechanism. More specifically, many
peers still contribute significant upload bandwidth without
necessarily improving their download performance. Such
contributions are produced by asymmetries in upload and
download bandwidth as well as by altruistic BitTorrent
behaviors like seeding and optimistic unchoking. (Sec-
tion 2.3 discusses this “ambient altruism” in detail.)
These exploits are not simply theoretical. Bit-
Tyrant [15] takes advantage of the intrinsic altruism to
achieve high download rates while reducing upload con-
tributions. Most BitTorrent clients can be easily con-
figured to rely exclusively on leeching, and some re-
search suggests this is effective despite the TFT incen-
tives [10, 21].
Our goal in this work is to reduce the altruism in Bit-
Torrent seeding by adding incentives to the seeding com-
ponent of the protocol. We present the design and evalu-
ation of our seeding reward algorithm which requires a
minor change to BitTorrent in the form of a long-term
identifier for participating clients. Through simulation we
demonstrate that rewarded peers get better performance
than unrewarded peers. This differential creates an incen-
tive for rational nodes to switch into the rewarded pop-
ulation. We further show that the rewarding mechanism
improves node performance even when some portion of
the swarm is composed of BitTyrant nodes.
In the remainder of the paper, we first review the oper-
ations and altruism of BitTorrent in Section 2 as well as
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an overview of the BitTyrant variant. Sections 3 and 4
present our algorithm and the methodology we use to
evaluate its performance. Our results are detailed in Sec-
tion 5 and further analyzed in Section 6. We close with
a discussion of related work in Section 7 and our conclu-
sions in Section 8.
2 Background
BitTorrent [3] is a highly successful and popular peer-to-
peer protocol which aims to enable efficient, rapid distri-
bution of potentially large amounts of data to a group of
clients. It is designed to utilize the available upload band-
width of the clients to scale the capacity of the system to
support many users and has built-in mechanisms to incen-
tivize participation in this scheme.
2.1 The BitTorrent Protocol
A torrent is a file or a set of files users wish to down-
load. The data is divided into equal-sized pieces, typically
256KB, which are further subdivided into small blocks. A
central node called the tracker keeps track of the peers
participating in the distribution of a torrent. The tracker
does not serve the actual content, but instead serves as a
rendezvous point for peers to discover one another.
BitTorrent clients use a file of metadata, called a tor-
rent file, to begin downloading content. This file, typi-
cally downloaded from a traditional web server, specifies
the address for the tracker as well as information about
the files to be downloaded, including names, sizes, and
SHA-1 checksums for each piece.
The set of clients working on downloading a given tor-
rent is referred to as a swarm. Clients notify the tracker
as they join and leave the swarm, as well as every 30 min-
utes they are active within the swarm. To discover other
clients, a client may query the tracker, which gives it a
random subset of the active peers. (A variety of exten-
sions exist which supplement the tracker, including a gos-
sip protocol as well two DHT-based schemes.) Once it
has a set of peers, a client establishes TCP connections to
its peers, forming a neighborhood with whom it shares in-
formation about which pieces it has and has not completed
downloading. A legitimate publisher might establish one
or more official seeds, which provide round-robbin, best-
effort service to anyone who asks. These seeds are then
supplemented by altruistic peers who seed after they finish
their downloads.
2.2 BitTorrent Strategies
Popular BitTorrent clients employ a number of strategies
to encourage fair participation in uploading and to deal
with a variety of corner cases [3].
A client only uploads to a small number of peers in its
neighborhood at any given time. This group of nodes is
called the client’s active set. The size of the active set
is typically four, although both the reference implementa-
tion and BitTyrant [15] note that this number should scale
with maximum upload bandwidth capacity. The majority
of the nodes in the active set are the nodes that have given
the best service over a rolling 20 second average. The
client saves one or two slots in the active set for the explo-
ration of new neighbors. Optimistic unchokes pick a ran-
dom peer every 30 seconds, allowing the client to search
for better neighbors while also bootstrapping newly joined
clients that have not yet downloaded anything to share.
BitTorrent clients share current status information with
other clients to indicate which pieces are completely
downloaded. Clients will bias their block requests to com-
plete one piece before they begin downloading a different
piece. To pick a piece to download, BitTorrent follows
a rarest first policy, where a client picks pieces based on
lowest availability within its neighborhood. The excep-
tion to this rule is for new clients, which need a complete
piece before they can advertise any content for upload. In
this case, they instead pick a random piece.
When a block has been requested, a client does not reis-
sue the request until either the block is received or the re-
quest times out. This can be a problem when a user has
received most of the pieces in a file and has just has a few
outstanding requests to go. If the final peers are slow or
unresponsive, the system might never finish. In this case,
the client goes into endgame mode and sends redundant
requests for any missing blocks to its peers; as they are
received the client sends messages to the remaining peers
to cancel unnecessary requests.
2.3 Ambient Altruism and BitTyrant
BitTorrent aims to reduce the free-rider problem, but it is
not intended to eliminate altruism in the system. Instead,
BitTorrent aims to ensure that a node will experience sig-
nificantly improved performance if it participates in TFT
trading, rather than leeching. Consequently, altruistic fea-
tures remain in the protocol and pose two separate, but
related, problems. First, a client can reduce or eliminate
its own altruistic participation, reducing the overall swarm
performance. Second, if a client can recognize peers that
are participating altruistically, it may be able to obtain suf-
ficient service from these peers to find it unnecessary to
deal with those that require cooperation.
Two significant sources of altruistic contributions are
seeding and optimistic unchoking. Seeding is inherently
altruistic under the current BitTorrent protocol. The al-
truism of optimistic unchoking is more complex. The
optimistic unchoke operation is BitTorrent’s method of
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searching the peer space for better TFT service. An un-
choke that results in improved service because a better
peer is found is clearly not altruistic, but unchokes are
performed with random peers, rather than being biased
away from known leeches. This means that BitTorrent’s
standard unchoking behavior can still provide a source of
altruism, to the benefit of leeches.
Differences between peer bandwidth capacities also
produce altruism. When a normal BitTorrent client un-
chokes a peer, it sends data as fast as the TCP stack will
go, so peers with faster network connections will tend to
give more out than they get in return when dealing with
slower peers. Of course, two fast peers with content to
trade will be more likely to establish TFT trading with
one another than a fast peer and a slow peer.
BitTyrant is a strategic BitTorrent variant that exploits
ambient altruism and reduces its own altruistic contribu-
tions [15]. BitTyrant was designed to download as fast
as possible while contributing the minimum amount re-
quired to achieve it. To achieve this, BitTyrant abandons
BitTorrent’s policy of giving each member of the active
set an equal share of its upload bandwidth. Instead, Bit-
Tyrant unchokes as many neighbors as possible but limits
the speed of each upload stream to be only as much as is
necessary to obtain reciprocation.
This scheme does not work for other BitTyrant nodes,
however, and two BitTyrant nodes must enter a special
mode when dealing with each other. In Section 5.6, we
will describe this special mode in detail and demonstrate
how it can be used as part of a defense against BitTyrant’s
behavior.
3 Incentives Design
Our incentives design for seeding in BitTorrent requires
that the BitTorrent protocol support some form of long-
term identifier. The basic concept for our algorithm is
that BitTorrent clients recognize seeders from previous
swarms and this is impossible without these IDs. Fortu-
nately, the exchange of long-term identifiers can be built
into the peer handshaking process in a backwards compat-
ible fashion. Clients without a long-term ID are simply
assumed to have no history. It is also worth noting that
some clients [17] already support an optional long-term
ID.
Our proposed design consists of an observation phase
and a reward phase. The observation phase is in effect
whenever the node is receiving seeding bytes, or bytes re-
ceived from a neighboring peer without the expectation of
TFT reciprocation. The detection of seeding bytes, in our
basic implementation, is based on first-hand, verifiable in-
formation only. Obviously, it is possible that the neighbor
is only pretending to seed, but from the observing node’s
perspective, all bytes received without giving any bytes in
return are seeded bytes.
The reward phase occurs when the node is in seeding
mode. The goal is to schedule outbound seeding with
higher priority given to peers who have seeded in the past.
To do this, the algorithm first computes a score for each
node; nodes who seeded get higher scores. These scores
are used to initialize a scheduler, giving more slots to
nodes with higher scores. While virtually any scheduling
algorithm would suffice, we chose to use lottery schedul-
ing [24]. Each peer gets at least one ticket, but peers that
seed get additional tickets in proportion to the logarithm
of the number of bytes we have received from them in
seeding.
Obviously, a node that chooses to be a good citizen and
seed may not be rewarded at all in the future. For node A
to be rewarded by node B, A must seed to B and then B
must seed to A in some subsequent swarm. That means
that both nodes must interact repeatedly over time. For
any real benefit to the algorithm, a group of nodes must
interact repeatedly.
We note that a Sybil attack [4] is possible against this
protocol. For example, malicious nodes could create a
large number of false identifiers, gaining additional shares
of the bandwidth. We deal with this by reserving a per-
centage of a seeder’s upstream bandwidth for other known
seeders. Sybil attackers may well fight it out for the re-
maining unreserved bandwidth, but there is a larger pool
of bandwidth available if they cooperate.
Another possible Sybil attack would be a reincarnation
attack [13] where a client sheds an old identifier for a new
identifier in every swarm to erase previously observed bad
behavior. Such behavior would be unhelpful to the node,
however, because a fresh identifier begins with no rewards
at all. Rewards only come with observed good behavior.
4 Methodology
4.1 Simulator
We chose simulation as our primary method for analyzing
incentives and altruism in BitTorrent. The advantages of a
simulator over real world tests or the use of network emu-
lation lies primarily in the repeatability of the experiment
and the time required to run the experiment. Our research
requires comparison of algorithms against one another as
well as experimentation with hundreds of combinations
of parameters. Repeatability and fast time to completion
were both incredibly helpful.
Several BitTorrent simulators exist but they did not
fully meet our needs. One simulator from MSR [1] does
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not implement asynchronous communication nor does
it capture some BitTorrent details, such as piece chunk
transmission, that we deemed necessary. An ns-2 [5] Bit-
Torrent simulator was also available, but it simulates TCP
effects and other network level details that were too low
level for our purposes. GPS [25] is a general purpose p2p
simulator that includes a BitTorrent module and simulates
at about the same level of granularity as our work. GPS is
written in Java and our work appears to run faster.
To meet our objective, we have designed an optimized
C++ simulator with a Python front end for simulation
setup and execution. Our simulator allows swarms of
thousands of clients, with several hundred running simul-
taneously, many times faster than real-time. To illustrate
this, we ran a series of tests on an Athlon 2.4Ghz dual-
processor server with 4GB of RAM and running with the
Linux 2.6.9 kernel. These tests employed a simple swarm
where a given number of clients arrive simultaneously and
join the swarm. There is only a single seed for the swarm.
We fix the file size at 100MB, the seed’s upload capacity
at 512Kbps, and each client’s bandwidth at 56Kbps, sym-
metric for uploads and downloads. The results for various
swarm sizes is shown in Table 1. These results show that
the time required to simulate the swarm is proportional to
the number of peers.
4.2 Simulation Setup
All the evaluations in this paper are based on a flash-
crowd, 1GB file BitTorrent swarm. We used a total popu-
lation of 2000 DSL clients with a range of download band-
widths from 128Kbps to 5Mbps. Each client’s upload
bandwidth is precisely half of its download bandwidth. To
obtain reasonable churn, we make use of real-world Bit-
Torrent traces taken in 2005 by Johan Pouwelse. These
traces provide realistic join times for flash-crowd behav-
ior in real swarms.
Each simulation is also configured with experiment-
specific parameters. The significant parameters are:
Seeding Time The 2000 clients of the swarm are as-
signed one of three seeding population types. Altruis-
tic clients will seed for 24 to 48 hours after their down-
load is complete. Standard clients seed for one to two
hours. Leech clients terminate their connection imme-
diately after downloading the object. These values are
based on why peers choose to seed; altruistic clients in-
tentionally stay around to be helpful, standard clients
will continue running until the user notices the down-
load is done and kills the client, and leech clients leave
as quickly as possible. Even though these numbers are
guesses, we have validated that a swarm with 10% altru-
istic nodes and 70% standard nodes yields seed-to-swarm
Figure 1: Simulated swarm membership over time based
on a real-world trace from a flash-crowd swarm.
ratios similar to those observed in a prior measurement
study. (Figure 1 in this paper closely resembles Figure 5
in Pouwelse et al. [16].)
Seeding Algorithm Populations in the swarm can be as-
signed to use different seeding algorithms. The standard
seeding algorithm simply seeds round-robbin to all of the
peers in a seed’s neighborhood. We also support an “in-
centives seeding” algorithm, as described in Section 3.
Incentives Seeding Parameters For peers using the in-
centives seeding algorithm, we can vary the bandwidth
reservation for rewards as a percentage of the total band-
width; all incentives seeding nodes will use the same
reservation percentage in a given simulation run. Also, for
nodes using our rewarding seeding algorithm, we invent
a past history for each one, assigning them a number of
bytes that they have seeded in the past. We similarly vary
what portion of the population are aware of this history,
allowing us to simulate everything from oracular knowl-
edge of every node’s past behavior down to fragmentary
knowledge that would be a more realistic approximation
of prior, first-hand observations.
While oracular knowledge is unrealistic in practice, it
allows us to place an upper bound on the benefits of seed-
ing policies that use this knowledge. First hand informa-
tion is more limited in scope but much more difficult to
exploit [13]. In our research we are assuming that there
are no disjoint cliques of overlapping peers. This would
seem to adequately capture common classes of real-world
behavior as we might expect from people who download
related content, such as new episodes of TV shows re-
leased on a weekly basis.
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n Sim Time (hours) Real Time (hours) Messages Memory (MB)
10 5.86 0.004 233,950 20
100 4.77 0.07 1,381,715 60
1000 5.24 0.86 13,635,955 492
Table 1: Basic simulator performance as the number of simulated nodes (n) grows.
Trading Algorithm We have implemented both the
regular BitTorrent TFT and the BitTyrant trading algo-
rithms in our simulator. Trading and seeding algorithms
may be assigned independently; a peer can use the Bit-
Tyrant trading algorithm and our incentives seeding algo-
rithm if desired.
4.3 Incentives Evaluation
Our goal is to create an incentive for participants in Bit-
Torrent to seed. We will evaluate the effectiveness of
our algorithm by demonstrating that rewarded populations
perform better than unrewarded populations in our simu-
lated swarms. By running the experiments under a vari-
ety of configuration parameters, we will characterize how
these parameters affect the success of our incentives algo-
rithm.
In evaluating the performance of a node, our basic mea-
surement is the download efficiency, defined as the utiliza-
tion of the peer’s download pipe over its lifetime in the
swarm. Efficiency is a direct measure of the node’s happi-
ness, and it is perfectly normalized. Any node, regardless
of speed, cannot be happier than when it has 100% down-
load utilization.
Computing the efficiency e is straightforward. Let k be
the maximum download capacity of the node measured in
bits per second (bps). Then let t0 be the time the peer con-
nected to the swarm and let td be the time that it finished
the download, where both values are measured in seconds.
Finally, let n be the number of bits in the download object.
Then
e =
n/(td − t0)
k
.
Of course, when simulating a large population of
nodes with various configurations assigned at random, we
would expect significant variation in individual nodes’ ef-
ficiency, even when they have the same configuration.
Figure 2 shows cumulative distribution functions over
nodes’ efficiency in a simulation with altruistic, standard,
and leech nodes. A curve that stays closer to the bottom
of the graph, as the altruistic data series does, represents
more nodes operating closer to their peak efficiency. (This
experiment shares the same configuration as used later in
Figure 12.)
While we could potentially generate a figure like this
Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of efficiency (band-
width utilization) over different populations in the same
swarm.
Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of download time over
different populations in the same swarm. (A different
view of the same experiment shown in Figure 2.)
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Median Efficiency (%) Median Download time (s)
Altruistic Standard Leech Altruistic Standard Leech
98.8 48.9 90.1 3304 7443 4402
Table 2: Comparison of median efficiency and median download time for the same experiment.
Population Average Std. Dev 95% Confidence Interval
Altruistic 98.0% 1.8% 4.1%
Standard 57.9% 8.5% 15.3%
Leech 87.6% 4.8% 8.2%
Table 3: Median efficiency, averaged over twenty different experimental runs, differing only in the random seed.
Population Average Std. Dev 95% Confidence Interval
Altruistic 97.9% 1.9% 4.6%
Standard 71.1% 7.9% 11.9%
“Leech” 71.2% 7.6% 12.9%
Table 4: Median efficiency, averaged over twenty experimental runs as above, with the leech nodes replaced by
standard nodes.
for every possible simulation configuration, and every
simulation run would generate a figure with the same gen-
eral shape, this would obscure trends from one simulation
to the next. Instead, we observe that the median value of
each data series (i.e., the efficiency value for which the
data series reaches 50% on the y-axis) represents an ef-
fective proxy for the overall behavior of the data. If the
median values are close, then the curves will be close. If
the median values are far apart, then the curves will be far
apart.
For our experiments, then, any given set of experimen-
tal parameters (as described in Section 4.2) will yield
three values: the median efficiency of each of the three
populations (altruistic, standard, and leech), which we can
then plot as we vary the simulation parameters.
An alternative to efficiency would be to consider the
download times, without normalizing them for differences
in each node’s available bandwidth. Figure 3 shows CDFs
of download times for the same experimental setup as
Figure 2. We added an “optimal” distribution, repre-
senting the best that the altruistic nodes could ever have
performed if they had achieved 100% utilization of their
download bandwidth. We could have added additional
“optimal” lines for each population, but this would make
reading the figure more complicated. Furthermore, me-
dian values are less meaningful because the underlying
distribution of bandwidths would vary if the random as-
signment were done differently.
Of course, absolute download time and download effi-
ciency are measuring the same underlying phenomenon;
improving one metric would clearly improve the other.
Table 2 shows the median values from each of these fig-
ures. The efficiency values elide unnecessary experimen-
tal details and concisely describe the relative performance
of each population.
Lastly, we must convince ourselves that efficiency is
a reliable metric from one experimental run to the next.
Since many of the parameters in our system are as-
signed randomly, we experimentally re-ran our experi-
ment twenty times, each time with a different random
seed. The results, shown in Table 3, show significant vari-
ation from one run to the next, but the variations among
altruistic nodes are smaller than among standard nodes.
For an additional experiment, we changed the leech nodes
to be standard nodes. We would expect, then, that they
would behave the same as standard nodes. Table 4 clearly
validates this behavior.
From these measurements, it appears that standard
nodes are more likely to be the victims of circumstance,
while altruistic nodes and leech nodes are more stable in
the face of random variation. As such, the reported per-
formance of standard nodes should be considered to be
noisier than the reported performance of altruistic or leech
nodes. While we could precisely work out the minimum
change between different populations that would repre-
sent a statistically significant difference, this is insuffi-
cient for our needs. Experimentally, we must show that
our desired altruistic behavior doesn’t just make a statis-
tically significant improvement. We must show a large
enough improvement to incentivize BitTorrent users to
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Figure 4: The median efficiency of the overall swarm un-
der different compositions of clients. The worst perfor-
mance is experienced when there is only one seed. When
70% of the clients seeding for 1-2 hours, the performance
improves significantly. When 10% of the nodes seed for
1-2 days, the median efficiency approaches 100%.
choose clients that follow our desired behavior.
(For the remainder of the paper, we only run each ex-
periment a single time for a given set of experimental pa-
rameters. Since each data point takes as long as a day to
compute, we cannot afford to run every experiment twenty
different times.)
5 Evaluation
In this section, we detail the findings of our research.
We will first demonstrate why seeding is important for
swarms of nodes with asymmetric bandwidth. We will
then demonstrate how our algorithm improves perfor-
mance for seeding nodes. The next three subsections
explore how bandwidth reservation, altruistic population
size, and rewarding node overlap impact the effectiveness
of our seeding algorithm. Finally, we analyze the perfor-
mance of our algorithm in swarms that include BitTyrant
nodes.
5.1 Importance of Seeding
Our first objective was to establish the importance of seed-
ing to a BitTorrent swarm. We ran our simulation with
three different population configurations. First, we ran
the swarm with 1 initial seed and 100% of the swarm
composed of our leech clients that do no seeding what-
soever. Next, we ran the swarm with 1 initial seed, 70%
of the standard clients that do a small amount of seeding,
and 30% of the leech clients. Finally, we ran a simulation
with 10% altruistic nodes that seed significantly, 70% of
the standard clients, and 20% of the leech clients. The
results are shown in Figure 4.
There are two reasons why the swarm cannot obtain
high efficiency without significant seeding contributions.
First, the swarm is comprised of nodes with asymmetric
bandwidth profiles. In our swarm, the upload is always
half of the download capacity. Even with idealized op-
erations, a swarm could hope for no more than 50% effi-
ciency from TFT trading alone. The second issue is that
a BitTorrent swarm is not ideal. Various factors such as
churn reduce the effectiveness of the protocol. Seeding
provides enough additional capacity to overcome these
deficiencies.
Clearly, seeding is essential for nodes in a swarm to
maximize their download bandwidth; if we can design a
mechanism that incentivizes more BitTorrent users to seed
for longer periods, this should have a clear, positive im-
pact on the system.
5.2 Rewarding Seeding
To evaluate our reward seeding algorithm, we first ran a
baseline simulation. The setup for this simulation was
10% altruistic nodes, 70% of the standard clients, and
20% of the leech clients. All three populations were run-
ning the standard BitTorrent trading and seeding algo-
rithms, thus we expected all three populations to expe-
rience similar performance. As expected, the results for
all three populations was near 100% efficiency.
We then repeated this baseline experiment with all of
the altruistic nodes configured to run our reward seeding
algorithm, reserving 75% of their bandwidth for rewards
to prior seeders. The other two populations continued to
use normal seeding algorithms. In this version of our ex-
periment, we assumed perfect overlap for this altruistic
group. In other words, every altruistic node had been pre-
viously seeded by every other altruistic node, prior to the
start of the experiment, and would thus allow the other
altruistic nodes to share in the bandwidth reserved for re-
wards. The results of this simulation are shown in Fig-
ure 5. The altruistic population maintained nearly perfect
efficiency, while the two unrewarded populations experi-
enced a significant drop in performance.
5.3 Bandwidth Reservation
As described before, our seeding algorithm can reserve
bandwidth for the exclusive use of nodes being rewarded.
To understand the necessity of these bandwidth reserva-
tions, we ran a simulation where we varied the percentage
of reserved vs. unreserved seeding bandwidth. The re-
sults, shown in Figure 6, show the median efficiency of
the altruistic, standard, and leech populations in simula-
tions with different reserved bandwidth configurations. In
all simulations, there are 10% altruistic, 70% standard,
and 20% leech clients. The bandwidth reservation applies
to altruistic nodes’ seeding bandwidth. For the moment,
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Figure 5: Median efficiency when the altruistic popula-
tion reserves 75% of the seeding bandwidth for other al-
truistic nodes.
we are assuming that altruistic nodes all have prior history
and know which other nodes have seeded in the past.
One immediate observation is that our seeding algo-
rithm, without any bandwidth reservation, does no bet-
ter than normal seeding. This seems counter-intuitive be-
cause the rewarded nodes should still be getting more
seeded bytes than their unrewarded peers. One might
think that there would be some performance improvement
for the altruistic nodes, even with 0% reserved bandwidth,
but they are already getting nearly 100% efficiency.
With bandwidth reservations, if there is insufficient de-
mand from the “reward” population, then that portion of
the seeding bandwidth will go unused. In short, our work
suggests that the only way to create a performance dif-
ferential between rewarded and non-rewarded nodes is to
withhold service from unrewarded nodes.
There is an interesting trade-off, however. If the reser-
vation is too high, then all of the bandwidth is effectively
being spent on maintaining old relationships rather than
establishing new ones. As nodes quit old swarms and join
new ones on a regular basis, there is a clear incentive to
have seeded to strangers in the past if there might be a
payout in the future.
5.4 Altruistic Population Size
We cannot predict what percentage of nodes in a given
swarm might be running our reward seeding algorithm.
We would like to verify, regardless of the breakdown, that
incremental growth in the reward seeding group will yield
benefits both for those nodes as well as for everybody else.
This leads to the question of how the system will respond
as the population dynamics change. Figure 7 shows how
efficiency changes as a function of the percentage of the
altruistic and standard populations in the total swarm. The
leech population is fixed at 20% and the rewarding nodes
Figure 6: Median efficiency as a function of the reserved
bandwidth by the altruistic nodes.
Figure 7: Median efficiency as a function of the percent-
age of altruistic nodes in the swarm.
Figure 8: Median efficiency as a function of the percent-
age of overlap in the altruistic nodes.
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reserve 75% of their bandwidth.
This experiment demonstrates that the performance of
the entire swarm improves as more nodes follow our altru-
istic scheme, even when reserving 75% of their bandwidth
for reward seeding. That other 25% is enough to improve
things for everybody else.
At some point, beyond the 30% altruism rate where we
terminated our simulation, the standard nodes may have
sufficient efficiency that they would be disincentivized to
change to the altruism strategy. By then, the altruism strat-
egy would already be the dominant behavior in the swarm.
Also, regardless of the rate of altruistic nodes, this exper-
iment shows that altruism always wins, and sometimes
wins big, even with relatively low populations of altruis-
tic nodes.
5.5 Overlap
In this section, we explore the highly critical overlap pa-
rameter. Our algorithm assumes that nodes are rewarding
based on first-hand information gleaned from prior inter-
actions in prior swarms. In previous experiments, we have
assumed that this knowledge of prior interactions, which
we call overlap, is complete. Every node has prior, posi-
tive interactions with its altruistic peers and thus knows to
include them in the reward population during future inter-
actions. Such oracular knowledge is not realistic.
For simulation purposes, we wish to vary the degree
to which altruistic nodes have had past interactions with
other altruistic nodes and thus have the first-hand knowl-
edge necessary to give reward seeding to their peers. To
accomplish this, we partition the altruistic nodes into two
sub-groups: rewarding and non-rewarding nodes. Re-
warding nodes will reward all other altruistic nodes, in-
cluding non-rewarders, while non-rewarding nodes will
reward nobody. Non-rewarding nodes still have the same
75% bandwidth reservation, but they never use it. By
varying the ratio of rewarding to non-rewarding nodes,
we can roughly simulate the real-world effects that might
be seen as the degree of overlap between altruistic nodes
varies.
Figure 8 shows the efficiency for each population as
a function of the percentage of altruistic nodes that are
rewarders. We maintain a 10% altruistic, 70% standard,
and 20% leech population. Reserved bandwidth remains
fixed at 75%.
Our experiment demonstrates that overlap is clearly
necessary to achieve the benefits of our reward seed-
ing strategy. Once the overlap reaches 50% (i.e., about
half of the seeding interactions between altruistic nodes
are rewarded with higher bandwidth), the performance
improvement for the altruistic strategy is undeniable.
Whether such an overlap rate can be achieved in the real
world is unclear. We discuss some strategies that might
compensate for this in Section 6.
5.6 Seeding Rewards versus BitTyrant
In this section, we test the altruistic reward seeding al-
gorithm against clients running the more aggressive Bit-
Tyrant trading algorithm. BitTyrant clients tend to see im-
proved performance at the expense of other nodes in the
system. (BitTyrant was introduced in Section 2.3.)
Our first experiment, shown in Figure 9, pits rewarding
seeders against tyrannical leeches. This test repeats the
bandwidth reservation experiment of Section 5.3 with the
leeching population configured to use the BitTyrant trad-
ing algorithm. All other parameters remain the same.
Comparing these results against those of the earlier
bandwidth reservation test, we note that BitTyrant-leeches
performed as well as the rewarded altruists. At the same
time the leeches degraded the performance of the stan-
dard nodes significantly. From this we conclude that
the reward-seeding algorithm protects against, or at least
ameliorates the exploitation of the BitTyrant protocol, but
that it does not sufficiently penalize the leeching clients.
To evaluate how the size of the altruistic population im-
pacts the performance of these populations, we repeated
the experiment of Section 5.4, again with the rewarding
altruistic seeders versus the tyrannical leeches. We hoped
that increasing numbers of altruists might be able to pe-
nalize the tyrannical leeches. Unfortunately, as shown
in Figure 10, the tyrannical leeches still had no trouble
achieving near perfect efficiency.
We considered the possibility that the leeching nodes
would not do so well if the altruistic nodes were more
stingy during the TFT trading phase. To test this, we re-
configured the bandwidth reservation test. In this experi-
ment, the altruists use the BitTyrant TFT strategy rather
than the default BitTorrent TFT strategy, but still per-
form the incentivized reward seeding. The leech popula-
tion still practices tyrannical TFT trading and never seeds.
The standard population uses standard algorithms for both
seeding and TFT trading. All other simulation parameters
remained the same. The results are shown in Figure 11.
Based on these experiments, a rational user might just
as well run a tyrannical client as an altruistic client. They
will receive the same download efficiency and they will
minimize their upload bandwidth.
5.7 BitTyrant Exploitation
In the pursuit of finding a weakness in BitTyrant’s seem-
ingly anti-social behavior, we discovered a problem with
BitTyrant’s exchange mechanism (also noted by Carra et
al. [2]). The original BitTyrant paper [15] says:
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Figure 9: Altruistic nodes versus tyrants under different
amounts of reserved bandwidth.
Figure 10: Altruistic nodes versus tyrants with different
ratios of altruistic nodes in the population.
Figure 11: Reward-seeding altruists, modified to trade
tyrannically before they begin seeding, versus tyrant-
leeches under different amounts of reserved bandwidth.
Figure 12: Median efficiency when altruistic nodes refuse
to seed anything to tyrannical leech nodes.
As such, BitTyrant continually reduces send
rates for peers that reciprocate, attempting to
find the minimum rate required. Rather than at-
tempting to ramp up send rates between high
capacity peers, BitTyrant tends to spread avail-
able capacity among many low capacity peers,
potentially causing inefficiency due to TCP ef-
fects.
To work around this ... effect, BitTyrant adver-
tises itself at connection time using the Peer ID
hash. Without protocol modification, BitTyrant
peers recognize one another and switch to a
block-based TFT strategy that ramps up send
rates until capacity is reached.
The authors believe that their weakness is looking for too
many low bandwidth flows, or that the many low band-
width flows are inefficient because of TCP effects.
To evaluate this, we ran several simulations without the
BitTyrant block-level TFT component (i.e., we disabled
BitTyrant’s ability to detect that a peer is also running
BitTyrant). BitTyrant nodes did very poorly when com-
municating with each other.
BitTyrant assumes it is receiving reciprocation when it
receives an unchoke. This is a valid assumption for Bit-
Torrent nodes, but it is not as clear of a signal from another
BitTyrant node because it does not indicate how much
they are willing to upload. So, if two BitTyrant nodes
unchoke each other, they both assume they have an esti-
mate for the minimum upload speed necessary to achieve
reciprocation. They then both begin to drop their upload
rates potentially down to zero in a quest to achieve lower
estimates for the minimum upload speed.
BitTyrant solves this problem by self-identification,
disabling the reciprocation-discovery mechanism because
it doesn’t really work between two tyrants. This identifi-
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cation features can be exploited by altruistic nodes to deny
service to tyrants! A BitTyrant node cannot lie or obscure
that it’s a tyrant without incurring a penalty when trading
with other tyrants.
We re-ran our baseline simulation with 10% altruistic,
70% standard, and 20% leech nodes. The altruistic nodes
used the normal trade algorithm and our reward seeding
algorithm. The leech nodes used the BitTyrant trade algo-
rithm. Bandwidth was reserved at 75% and the altruistic
nodes ignored tyrants during seeding, but interacted with
them normally when still downloading the torrent. The
results are shown in Figure 12.
By ignoring tyrants, the altruistic nodes achieve a small
but significant performance improvement relative to the
tyrants. There may well be other ways to exploit tyrants,
such as refusing to interact with them at all. It is suffi-
cient to say that BitTyrant is vulnerable to exploitation,
itself, as a consequence of its necessary self-identification
mechanism.
6 Discussion and Future Work
The development of this research gives rise to a number
of important discussion points that we will address here.
These points include issues relating to the practicality of
our algorithm to real-life solutions as well as topics of
future research.
Privacy / Anonymity is of significant concern for many
BitTorrent users. Naturally, a long-term identifier would
impact anonymity. However, the BitTorrent protocol
was never engineered to provide anonymity to BitTorrent
users. (They announce their presence to everybody in
the swarm, based on their IP address, and advertise what
pieces they have available to trade!) From this perspec-
tive, a long-term identifier is not much worse than an IP
address.
On the other hand, if a BitTorrent user chose to tun-
nel BitTorrent through an anonymization system like Tor,
then the IP address would be obscured, while the long-
term identifier would still be advertised. While a number
of BitTorrent users do tunnel traffic through Tor, their per-
formance will suffer greatly, as Tor was never intended to
support the kind of massive, sustained traffic flows that
BitTorrent can generate. Engineering an anonymity ser-
vice specifically for BitTorrent would be an interesting
opportunity for future research.
Bootstrapping and Overlap are the most critical con-
cerns for further development of this incentives mecha-
nism. The reward mechanisms in our research depend on
the same nodes seeing one another, again and again. This
may not occur much, in the general case, but it could well
happen in particular subcommunities.
Existing Small Groups: A number of relatively small
(compared to the entire world) communities exist for the
purpose of BitTorrent distribution. The traces we de-
scribed in Section 4 were collected from filelist.org over
a three month period. This community requires a sign-in
name which was associated with each download. We ob-
served that 50% of all peers participated in at least two of
the same swarms. These types of groups would be able
to switch over to the seed-rewarding algorithm with very
little difficulty and would likely have sufficient overlap.
Social Groups: Existing social communities, brought
together by mutual interests on social networks, could be
used to leverage a relatively small BitTorrent community
suitable for the seed-rewarding algorithm.
Shared Interests: Even without explicit social group-
ings, one would reasonably expect that many people will
follow similar patterns. For example, a variety of tele-
vision shows are distributed via BitTorrent. Users who
download the current show are likely to download subse-
quent shows. Similar affinities would be expected around
other content that is updated on a regular basis, such as
updated Linux distributions.
Transitive Trading and similar methods, may be able
to ameliorate the need for extensive overlap. Transitive
trading [12, 11] allows two clients that have never met to
exchange “credits” through a mutual contact.
BitTyrant is an important development in BitTorrent
because it improves the efficiency of certain core con-
cepts. For example, the optimistic unchoke in standard
BitTorrent trading is a search method for finding better
peers, but it simply searches randomly. However, as we
discussed in Section 5.7, BitTyrant clients must identify
whether they are speaking to other tyrants and change
strategies. Otherwise, the default BitTyrant TFT strat-
egy will have both clients dropping their bandwidth all
the way to zero.
This BitTyrant flaw creates interesting opportunities.
Since BitTyrant clients must identify themselves as such,
they can be trivially ignored by other clients who, perhaps,
do not with to support their tyrannical behavior. However,
there are many other options. BitTyrant clients (or, re-
ally, any BitTorrent client) could publish categorical state-
ments about their unchoking policies. For example a node
might declare: “If you give me at least X bytes per sec-
ond, then I’ll unchoke you and give you X in return, up
to Y bytes per second max.” Of course, a tyrant could
lie about such policies, but it creates an interesting op-
portunity for future research, both in terms of simulation
studies and in terms of economic modeling.
Carra et al. [2] also examined the strengths of
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BitTyrant-style behavior versus simply expanding the
number of simultaneous connections in traditional Bit-
Torrent clients by simulation. However, their simula-
tion models ignored churn and other real-world conditions
leading us to believe that their results are unreliable.
7 Related Work
The BitTorrent protocol and associated algorithms were
introduced by Cohen in 2003 [3] with a reference client
implementation. A fluid model for the system was given
by Qiu et al. [18], who used it to show that in certain
cases a Nash equilibrium can exist in systems where peers
choose upload rates to match their download rates. Stud-
ies performed on emulated swarms by Legout et al. [8]
validated the effectiveness of the BitTorrent unchoking al-
gorithm. Legout et al. [9] also concluded from real-world
tests that the rarest-first algorithm is very important to sys-
tem performance, and argued that the default unchoking
algorithm provides adequate robustness from free-riders.
A fluid-model simulator was used by Bharambe et
al. [1] to represent a BitTorrent system in a more abstract
manner than our own. They confirmed the utility of the
rarest-first policy for piece selection. They also investi-
gated unfairness with respect to volume uploaded and ar-
gued that the rate-based TFT strategy fails to prevent such
unfairness, especially in systems with a great disparity
of bandwidth among peers. They proposed a new block-
level, volume-based TFT trading algorithm, although sub-
sequent researchers challenged its effectiveness [9].
De Vogeleer et al. [23], made an event-based simula-
tor for BitTorrent based on the algorithms in the reference
implementation and used it to model a variety of typical
swarm scenarios, verifying the performance characteris-
tics against the expected behavior of a standard BitTorrent
client.
A simulation-based study by Eger et al. [5] compared
flow-level and packet-level simulations for BitTorrent-like
systems and found that, while flow-level simulations are
useful for demonstrating the theoretic performance of the
de facto BitTorrent scheme, the delay of TCP packets
and other cross-layer effects have a significant impact on
BitTorrent performance, and these effects require a more
granular simulation to be adequately captured.
Much research has been performed concerning the
robustness of BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat trading mechanism
against selfish behaviors. BitTorrent was modeled as a
form of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma problem by Jun
et al. [7], who suggested that the current peer-selection al-
gorithm is susceptible to free-riders; they proposed a dif-
ferent TFT strategy. Tian et al. [22] used mathematical
models as well as simulation-based and real-world exper-
iments to argue for a modified TFT algorithm.
Sirivianos et al. [21] emulated a strictly free-riding
client which contacts the tracker often to gain a large
neighborhood from which to free-ride; they concluded
that this attack was feasible in practice. Liogkas et al. [8]
use PlanetLab to demonstrate three different exploits:
downloading from seeds, downloading from the fastest
peers, and advertising fake pieces.
8 Conclusion
At present, BitTorrent’s seeding mechanism is entirely al-
truistic; nodes have no rational reason to offer seeding ser-
vice to their peers, yet the additional bandwidth provided
by seeding is essential to the efficient operation of BitTor-
rent. Anything that can encourage seeding would have an
immediate knock-on benefit for BitTorrent users.
In this work, we have proposed a method for rewarding
seeding in BitTorrent by means of long-term identifica-
tion. Nodes remember peers that seeded to them in the
past and reciprocate by seeding to them in later swarms.
To evaluate our algorithm and its parameter space, we
developed and employed a flow-level simulator. The al-
gorithm was tested on realistic file-sizes and trace-driven
churn to improve its accuracy. We found that our algo-
rithm improved the download efficiency of the BitTorrent
nodes from 70% to 95% or better. This improvement rep-
resents the upper bound of our algorithm’s performance
and was based on oracular knowledge that would not be
available in real scenarios. We tested more realistic set-
tings and found that our algorithm could still increase the
download efficiency by ten percentage points.
Finally, we evaluated our seed-rewarding algorithm in
swarms that had some portion of the population running
BitTyrant, a variant on BitTorrent that is aggressive about
getting fast downloads with minimal investments of up-
load bandwidth. We found that our algorithm could pro-
tect nodes from being exploited by BitTyrant, but could
not sufficiently penalize tyrannical behavior to discourage
users from choosing to run BitTyrant. However, leverag-
ing a weakness in BitTyrant, where BitTyrant nodes must
identify themselves as such, we can ignore tyrants during
seeding and reduce their performance.
So long as BitTorrent peers have sufficient overlap
in successive swarms, allowing them to build individual
long-term histories of who has seeded in the past, we
conclude that BitTorrent peers using our incentivized re-
ward seeding algorithm will enjoy better performance for
themselves and also improve performance for their peers,
whether running our algorithm or not. By adding in our
mechanism, for which peers have a genuine incentive to
follow, we can build better robustness in BitTorrent.
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